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Evidence-based policymaking in Myanmar? 
Considerations of a post-conflict development dilemma 
 
Mareike Schomerus and Hakan Seckinelgin 
 
Introduction  
With a few months to go to Myanmar’s national elections, a further spotlight has been shone 
on the country’s political transition and developments since the groundbreaking national 
elections of 2010. The past five years have seen a tremendous change in the country, leaving 
citizens and analysts both hopeful and sceptical about the direction and sustainability of such 
rapidly-paced change (Jones 2014, Cheesman, Skidmore, and Wilson 2010). How to support 
what is perceived as positive change is a concern within the international development 
community now increasingly engaged in Myanmar, often operating with extremely limited 
information. This means that assumptions on how Myanmar’s path might look are often 
based on seemingly similar experiences elsewhere. However, what is made less explicit is 
that international actors contribute to the changing political landscape in many ways. One 
topic of discussion that has been made more prominent through the increased presence of 
international development actors and their experiences and foci elsewhere has been how to 
approach issues of transition and development through evidence-based policies. Implicit in 
this is an expression of the need for more information; further, basing policies on evidence is 
broadly expected to lead to improvement and transparency. But is pushing for better evidence 
in the policy-making process an obviously beneficial approach for Myanmar?  
 
The notion of basing policies on evidence has been a prominent one in development circles 
over the past few years; the emerging debate in Myanmar on the subject is thus not 
surprising. Here, the debate on using evidence for policy was refocused through the shock of 
cyclone Nargis in 2008. International humanitarian help after Nargis marked the beginning of 
an opening of Myanmar. Increased international engagement, with many processes of 
negotiation, blockade and engagement with international actors, occurred in parallel with 
internal political changes (Seekins 2009, Stover and Vinck 2008). Having been devastated by 
the cyclone and local organisations emerged, or became more prominent, inadvertently 
creating or strengthening a new set of civil society actors in the country (Centre for Peace and 
Conflict Studies 2008). The importance of using information to plan programming was 
foregrounded.  
 
Although basing policies on evidence now seems to be a well-established approach in 
international development, the approach does not provide a clear path towards improving 
development outcomes. It often remains unclear what type of evidence can be used to 
develop policies or how such evidence can be gathered. Through what process policies based 
on evidence will create a more balanced and less polarised transition is opaque. Framing the 
debate about the usefulness of evidence-based policies for Myanmar as part of a broader, 
seemingly internationally accepted trend in policy-making overlooks that basing policies on 
evidence is not a straightforward process. Evidence-based policies do, in fact, require a 
moment of evaluating information and elevating it to evidence, or downgrading it to 
refutation; they also need information in the first place. Evidence-based policies thus do not 
replace political choices with more neutral processes.   
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Whether developing policies only if they can be based on existing information is a realistic 
and sustainable approach is a broader question—albeit one that is of particular relevance to 
Myanmar, where access to power plays a large part in what information is available and to 
whom. The push for better evidence and better policies in Myanmar’s transition expresses a 
genuine need for better information. It is indeed an urgent priority to better understand the 
country and to establish a system in which decisions made by those governing are more 
transparently linked to either broader strategies or the welfare of the population. However, 
such aims too easily overlook the reality of Myanmar today. The country is in a situation of a 
difficult transition requiring negotiation and compromise, both of which are challenging to 
combine with basing policies on evidence alone—the transition is, after all, uncharted 
territory and cannot simply be guided by evidence gathered in different contexts. 
Furthermore, transitions require a willingness to sequence attention to particular issues that 
might prove problematic if an issue can only be tackled once sufficient evidence exists.   
 
These challenges and contradictions might invite a complete dismissal of the notion of 
evidence-based policies for Myanmar. It is easy to judge the approach as one that has been 
imported—together with many other development norms—with the prominent arrival of 
international actors. The situation in Myanmar is more nuanced than that, primarily because 
the country's history has created a particular sense of how information is created and used to 
support political choices. The political experience inside and outside the country amongst 
advocacy groups, diaspora and dissidents has been one of having to battle government 
control of information while also constructing information in a particular way. National 
actors are currently particularly sensitive towards debates on knowledge production and 
information. The diversifying landscape of political and development actors in the country is 
thus actively seeking knowledge that challenges national received wisdom and international 
norms and their applicability. At the same time, they are aiming to influence policy and the 
broader direction of the country's changes. Radical approaches to evidence-based policy are 
thus not helpful. Embracing or dismissing the notion does not do justice to the delicate 
relationship between information, policy, change and understanding in Myanmar's fracturable 
and powerful transition. 
 
Structure of the paper 
To examine the complicated relationship between information, information actors, debate and 
implementation in Myanmar today, this paper is divided into four sections. The first section 
sets out the three challenges of the reality of basing policies on evidence; section two breaks 
down each challenge in the context of Myanmar. The third section looks at the practices and 
interests of different knowledge actors. In section four we discuss what methods they use to 
produce knowledge and how they employ such knowledge. The conclusion summarises the 
emerging tensions between Myanmar’s history, the current process of transition, and the push 
for evidence-based policy. In all sections, our research focuses on the intersections of how 
evidence is understood and the patterns of behaviour that emerged during the prolonged 
conflict that frame the production and use of evidence.  
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Method 
This paper is based on 25 qualitative interviews conducted over a period of two weeks in late 
2014. Some interviews were held with multiple respondents, meaning that we interviewed 
more than 40 people in total. Respondents were assured anonymity since many had expressed 
concerns about talking openly. We conducted seventeen interviews with Burmese 
organisations with Burmese respondents in English. Sixteen interviews were with 
international representatives of international organisations. Two interviewees were foreign 
nationals working in organisations established in Myanmar. Not all interviewees are quoted 
directly, but the broader conclusions are derived from all interviews. 
 
Section 1: The central challenge of the debate on evidence-based policy 
In recent years, national and international debates on evidence and evidence-based policy 
have become a prominent part of policy-making considerations (Cartwright and Hardie 2012) 
(Teele 2014). Policy actors within international development—for example, the UK 
Department for International Development or the World Bank—have shown an increased 
interest in evidence-based policy. Behind this move lies the hope that rooting development 
interventions in evidence might improve their effectiveness (Cohen and Easterly 2009, 
Rodrik 2009) (Deaton 2010). Academic enterprises have become important players, notably 
the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Within the academic realm, the move towards evidence—or towards better evidence—relates 
to a drive towards an improved knowledge base so that policies can be made and 
implemented more effectively and efficiently (Banarjee and Duflo 2010). The subject areas of 
development economics, health, and education have all experienced new procedures that first 
aim to develop or provide evidence and then to support policy making (Jens, Kling, and 
Mullainathan 2011). It is from these areas of economics, health and education that definitions 
of what is meant by policy-relevant evidence are drawn. However, exactly how the link 
between evidence and policy is supposed to work remains crucially unarticulated. How 
uptake of evidence—putting information of one kind into a practice of another kind—can 
occur remains unclear. Consequently, research into the link between the production of 
evidence and the implementation of policies based on a particular piece of evidence remains 
crucial.  
 
There are different ways of thinking about evidence. Particularly among the actors 
mentioned, a prominent image suggests that evidence provides sturdy scaffolding for a 
particular policy, or advocacy for its implementation. Thus, evidence seems to set out 
scientific reasons as to why a policy needs to be implemented. In this context, evidence is 
usually debated at the stage when it is being produced. Once research methods are approved 
and evidence is produced using those methods, what is delivered is expected to become 
grounds for policy implementation. Such a notion of evidence differs significantly from how 
evidence is broadly used in law: in the legal context, conflicting evidence is used to contest or 
argue for a case (Lambert 2009).   
 
Arguing for a good knowledge base for specific policies or policy fields to support effective 
policies is an uncontroversial move. Consequently, it is not a challenging suggestion that 
evidence is needed to make policies. In fact, the notion of using evidence to make policies is 
now so entrenched that the proposal that policies can be drawn up through other processes is 
often met with surprise. However, what occurs in what seems like common-sense 
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considerations is a transposition of information and knowledge with evidence, meaning that 
these terms are used interchangeably. These three categories are related, but they are not the 
same thing. Their differences arise from the intentional activity of seeking evidence that 
allows a conclusive act, meaning that an action can be based on such evidence. 
 
Discussions about evidence-based policy come with three complications that are often 
overlooked in a more casual consideration of the usefulness of basing policies on evidence. 
These complications manifest themselves in three different components of seeking evidence:  
 
a) The nature of actors who seek evidence;  
b) how they seek evidence in a particular policy field;  
c) how they use evidence for the implementation of policies.  
 
The essence of what makes the debate on evidence-based policies challenging is to be found 
within these three components, within the dispositions and methods of the evidence 
production and implementation processes. 
 
The three steps of producing evidence-based policies 
Actors rely on evidential claims to justify their policy focus, but these evidential claims are 
not as rooted in an open market of ideas, possibilities and experiences as they might seem. 
This realisation is particularly important in the context of Myanmar as it serves as a reminder 
that the push for evidence-based policies does not automatically create a new scenario; 
instead what might occur is a continuation of what exists. With this in mind, three steps of the 
process need particular consideration. Step one involves the actors who produce or use 
evidence. Step two is how they seek evidence, followed by step three which is how they use 
it in implementing policies. These three steps allow a better disaggregation of each 
component of the process in which evidence is sought, highlighting the component’s unique 
challenge and its role in predetermining how the next step is taken. 
 
The first step is a claim made by a policy actor of the need for evidence. These claims do 
not come out of nowhere, but rather they often shroud the interests and standpoints of a 
policy actor in a particular policy area. A claim for the need for evidence is often linked to the 
political circumstances of the claim-maker, including their organisational mandates to have a 
role in a given policy field. Seeking evidence thus denotes that an actor stakes an interest 
claim. What this inevitably means is that the mandate, as well as political interests and 
positions, provides an interpretive framework within which the development of evidence is 
situated. This framework makes a distinction between information or data on the one side and 
evidence on the other. Since any information or data—existing or yet to be produced—is 
judged by the interpretative framework of interests and politics; it is shaped in such a way 
that it can be used as the supporting evidence needed to act in a given policy field. 
 
The second step is the process of producing evidence. This step is concerned with 
methods; it is about how to gather or structure information so that it can serve convincingly 
as evidence that justifies action. Examples of this second step include methods designed to 
show the effectiveness of particular policies in producing the expected results. Considerations 
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that allow for a comparison of different policy tools to assess their comparative advantage in 
delivering the policy more efficiently in a given policy field are prominent in this second 
step. In public policy, the approach has increasingly been to borrow from medical sciences 
and economics in using field experiments. These are supposed to show which interventions 
work. This methodological tendency also creates a distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative research in producing policy relevant knowledge. Whether, however, evidence 
drawn from field experiments is generalisable for other sites, situations, even countries, 
remains a challenging question. 
 
The third step is the use of policy justified by evidence developed or used by a policy 
actor. As noted above, the nature of a policy actor shapes how the need for evidence is 
framed. It determines ways of seeking such evidence and is a crucially influential factor in 
how actors use evidence when implementing a policy. Policy actors on the international 
stage, often performing in multiple countries—for example, international organisations or 
international NGOs—tend to work with organisation-wide policy frameworks for 
implementation. In addition, they often have best practice guides that help in-country 
implementation of an international policy.    
 
The three steps outlined here are interlinked. They determine how organisational interests and 
mandates frame the policy orientation and particular focus on issues. This happens before any 
evidence has been produced or an open question has been asked. The three steps serve as a 
reminder that the search for evidence-based policy is not simply about evidence or policies: it 
is also about interest, mandates, methods and wanting to show success. The concern with 
methods is of particular importance. Shifting the debate towards what particular type of 
information is considered valid in the evidence-based policy process often obscures the 
bigger problem that information or data alone does not create evidence. As the three steps 
outlined above have shown, labelling particular knowledge as evidence signifies that a 
particular interpretive framework has been applied; the framework is relevant for the work of 
an actor seeking evidence. In other words, the evidence label gives the impression that the 
knowledge implicit in the evidence is incontrovertible. In reality, when policy-makers present 
evidence what is communicated is a reflection of a pre-existing policy interests. 
 
The nature of policy-relevant knowledge 
The three steps of producing evidence-based policies outlined above highlight the need to 
focus on the nature of policy relevant knowledge. What kind of knowledge do policy makers 
need? What kinds of methods are most relevant for policy making; what are the ways in 
which knowledge deemed relevant for policy is produced? Can what is presented as evidence 
be generalised across the policy field and for policy making in that field? These are pertinent 
questions that are often overlooked in considerations of basing policy on evidence as a 
technical process. A view of this process as a technical issue focuses on methods of data 
gathering and on questions of how to disseminate data to decision-makers most effectively by 
spotting windows of opportunity to influence.  
 
Different policy fields are shaped with different needs and aims; also, different policy actors 
working in different socio-political and cultural contexts have different needs and aims. It is 
crucial to ask at any given point in the process who is seeking evidence. For what purpose is 
evidence being sought? Who are the target groups for a policy that is being developed? How 
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is the target group included in the evidence production? Does knowing about the success of a 
policy in one context allow conclusions regarding how the same policy would work in a 
different context, albeit in what appears to be a similar policy field? Or is it enough for policy 
actors to have an experience of policy implementation in one context to transfer the same 
policy elsewhere? What are the procedures for policy transfer between different contexts? 
Are such procedures relevant?   
 
These broad questions take into account the particularities of policy interventions in 
international development. This context is often framed by global policy initiatives; these 
come with funding and with actors wanting to facilitate the transfer of policy ideas and 
expertise across multiple contexts. The situation in Myanmar is currently defined by the 
tensions that appear when national political processes meet international expectations of such 
processes. The tension also influences how evidence is interpreted and used. The questions 
one needs to ask of evidence—listed above—also highlight that the move between having 
knowledge and using such knowledge within a policy process in a particular context is not a 
simple progression. Policy actors who claim to have evidence often expect that all policy 
fields present a common ground. This is particularly pertinent when policy actors come from 
different contexts, for example national or international settings. International policymakers 
in particular are often quick to establish a sense of shared mission, due to their experiences in 
a different context but with a similar policy issue and policy field. 
 
But therein lies a caveat. Even if a policy issue appears to be familiar, the context within 
which the issue emerges and the people who are affected will be different. Such difference is 
often obscured by the apparent similarity of the policy concern. While most national policy 
contexts create similar translation challenges for evidence-based policy debates, these trials 
are amplified in international development. International development approaches are often 
underwritten by assumptions. These dictate a policy's relevance and presumed effectiveness, 
regardless of whether assumptions locally are different and affect local policy processes and 
the behaviour of target groups in entirely different ways.  
 
 
Section 2: Meaning and reality of research and evidence in Myanmar  
We were interested in the way in which the debate on evidence-based policy is taking place 
within development policy interventions in situations of political transition, including in post-
conflict settings. Post-conflict work is one of the central areas of international development. 
Many international policy actors provide both policy support and funding to national 
governments for reconstruction, development, and for political processes that can be broadly 
defined as processes of democratisation. Most of these interventions aim to initiate change 
that helps society to go beyond the causes of conflict. The contextual challenges that are 
highlighted above are more pronounced in these conflict and post-conflict-contexts. 
Furthermore, given the immediate needs of a country after a conflict or a period of political 
repression, the determination of policy interventions creates a tension between the need for 
evidence to support or justify policies, and addressing urgent policy needs at multiple levels.  
 
In such situations, international organisations often use past experiences in other post-conflict 
contexts as evidence. The transplanting of one experience into another context is usually 
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justified because there is a lack of information or data readily available in the new post-
conflict context. Further, the notion that windows of opportunity will close if not filled with 
programming and interventions creates urgency. As a double-edged issue, this is particularly 
pronounced in Myanmar. 
 
In one sense, Myanmar presents a typical post-conflict setting, meaning that basic 
information and data is barely available. What is available is highly political and the 
credibility of data is viewed with suspicion. The assumed need to develop new policies in an 
expedient manner leads the implementation process and frames knowledge production 
practices. We thus considered the extent to which international actors' research practices 
dominate the country's post-conflict policy processes. Linked to this consideration is the 
question of what implications such diffusion of international practices might have for the 
national capacity to produce knowledge that is independent of the needs of policy makers. 
 
In trying to understand how evidence-based policy within Myanmar works, or might work, 
our aim was to think about the questions related to the three stages of evidence-based policy. 
These stages are the demand for evidence, evidence production, and evidence use in policy 
contexts; different policy actors ranging from national governments to civil society groups 
and international organisations might be involved. We wanted to understand the constraints 
different actors experience in their ability to develop or produce and then to use evidence for 
policy processes. This approach reveals relations among various actors. Also, it engages with 
the way in which the ability to respond to the push for evidence becomes a pathway for 
different actors to participate in policy processes.   
 
The meaning of evidence 
Often the debate about evidence-based policies seems to assume implicitly that a consensus 
has been found on what evidence is. The many ways in which respondents in Myanmar 
talked about, conceptualised and reflected on their use of the word evidence was striking, 
framing their views in distinctly political ways. This is most likely because the availability of 
information has been, and is, used politically to underwrite particular knowledge claims and 
policy stances in relation to different groups. Respondents expressed unease about the way in 
which technical and international approaches to evidence are considered. Although there was 
a consensus that using more information in the policy process is good, many respondents 
expressed hope that there could be more heterogeneous ways to engage with notions of 
evidence and policy. This was seen in contrast to settling on a homogenising technical 
approach to evidence. 
 
In our interviews, evidence was indeed considered in heterogeneous ways. Evidence was 
described or imagined, for example, as: 
 
1) Any statement that is provided by a higher authority (for example from teachers to    
students, or from political authorities to citizens); 
2)  a magic bullet to tackle complex socio-political problems; 
3)  a relationship to data - as absence of data, or as having access to data;  
4)  a technical debate on how to produce large data; 
5)  information produced in a technical manner;  
8 
 
6)  data interpreted according to local experiences and narratives about how to locate 
evidence to allow for broader diversity;  
7)  as a way of contextualising different claims rather than settling them.  
 
Independent of the way in which people articulated their understanding of evidence and the 
evidence debate, it was clear in all interviews that research was viewed as an important part 
of the process. Specifically, research was seen as necessary for the production of evidential 
claims and then also for proposing policy change and implementation. This confirms that this 
debate is an important one in and for Myanmar, but that further considerations are necessary 
about the relationship between research and policy.  
 
The relationship between research and policy-making 
We encountered different perspectives when asking about the extent to which research and 
information currently feed into the policy process. One common answer was that with limited 
research being conducted, information obviously played a limited role. This perspective, 
however, came with different narratives. The first narrative pertains to the fact that there is 
hardly any information available and that a body of knowledge has to be started from scratch.  
Hence research simply cannot yet play a role in basing policies on evidence. In particular, the 
few international respondents often categorically stated that no information at all existed. If 
that were the case, an evidence-based approach to policy-making in Myanmar would face 
almost insurmountable challenges.  
A second common narrative is that information exists, yet ways of accessing it, evaluating it 
and using it need to be adjusted. Respondents argued that government information before 
2008 is “not reliable and most of the data is not very useful….sometimes the information is 
purposely manipulated.”1 One respondent explained that the greatest challenge for 
development in Myanmar is the destruction of: “intellectual infrastructure. No data in this 
country is reliable. Period. People don’t value statistics and number and evidence in the way 
they should because in the last 45 years we came to believe that you can make up evidence. 
You can make up data. You can make up numbers.”2  
 
“Statistics in Myanmar is nothing, it’s unreliable,” explained another interviewee. “There are 
certain capacities in government with people who have been trained in statistics, so I think 
they have good people. But when we look at the military regime I would say that they have 
never listened to the evidence. In agriculture planning for example, information on yield is 
inflated, evidence is manipulated to suit their purposes.”3 It is important to note that 
respondents’ assessment of existing research as being manipulated extends beyond data 
provided by the government. They pointed out that opponents of the regime, particularly if 
working outside the country, produced research that reflected advocacy interests from often 
deeply divided interest groups. The conclusion we heard was that new ways of dealing with 
existing information are required. 
 
                                                 
1
 Respondent 1, male, national NGO, Burmese national. 
2
 Respondent 2, male, national NGO, Burmese national. 
3
 Respondents 3 and 4, male, national NGO, Burmese nationals. 
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Basing policies on evidence requires that certain facts are taken at face value and treated as if 
they are correct. A thorough investigation of the credibility of existing factual information 
would create a programming deadlock with which donors are not comfortable in a moment in 
which they hope for rapid political change. One approach to this lack of credible data might 
be to create new data and engage in research conducted using internationally accepted frames 
of reference. That such frames of reference are needed is a dominant narrative amongst 
international organisations and others interested in research. Some respondents noted this 
with concern, arguing that particular political challenges are overlooked in the quest for better 
evidence. One interviewee explained "the census was a good example… many [national] 
organisations said: let's not conduct the census. This is not a good time. But the UN agencies 
wanted evidence for their interventions."4 Another respondent explained: "UN agencies are 
pushing for more data…the public sector is trying to build this more reliable set of data. For 
the private sector, there is more market research, consumer surveys, consumer behaviour. 
People want to understand what they are setting foot in."5 Respondents regularly noted the 
tension inherent in needing evidence to start processes that are not fully understood. 
 
A third narrative is that the judgment that no information exists, or that none of it is usable, is 
wrong. Instead respondents argued that international actors in particular were not willing to 
consider information that predates their arrival in the country. "There is a huge amount out 
there and when I talk to the NGO or humanitarian community it's like it does not exist," 
explained one respondent.6 Respondents felt that while manipulation of data existed, it had 
not been done necessarily in a structured way, but that the government had controlled the use 
of data, and the conclusions drawn on the basis of it, but not necessarily the raw data. One 
respondent described it as a "controlling system that does not control anything" and that it 
had simply not used its existing data:  
 
The information is there, but it's about finding it, consolidating it. A lot 
of it is on Excel files that are so archaic that we can't open it. Or charts 
that have been created in Word but the original files have been lost. And 
two out of three people we work with in the ministry of education don't 
know how to use computers, so we can't ask them to transcribe it.7  
 
Another respondent also stressed that state manipulation was not as systematic or profound as 
is commonly assumed: “This is a weak state. People have the illusion that this was an all-
controlling dictatorship along the lines of North Korea. But the state here is very weak 
outside the military.”8  
 
From these three narratives about data and information, a number of research, evidence and 
policy relevance trends emerged.  
                                                 
4
 Respondents 3 and 4, male, national NGO, Burmese nationals. 
5
 Respondent 5, male, national private sector organisation, non-Burmese national. 
6
 Respondent 6 and 7, male and female, national organisation, Burmese and non-Burmese national. 
7
 Group discussion 1, males and females, national organisation with international partnership, Burmese and non-
Burmese nationals. 
8
 Respondent 5, male, national private sector organisation, non-Burmese national. 
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1. There is a need to establish a body of factual information while carefully navigating the 
danger that this might cement a particular understanding of what research means. With the 
need for factual information great, the danger is that research becomes reduced to being 
understood as fact-finding missions that provide limited analysis. One respondent from an 
international organisation funding basic research summed up this tension between 
information need and the risk of establishing information as being considered synonymous 
with research: “Nobody knows how many local development funds are there; there is no 
understanding what the local ecosystem on these is right now. So researching this and laying 
it out for people what’s actually happening, that’s not really research and not sustainable… I 
am continually surprised how little information is out there.”9  
 
2.  Research gaps exist: There is limited credible quantitative work; qualitative work tends  
not to go beyond superficial focus group approaches. One respondent explained in regards to 
health research that "what you find is that people come in with a bit of money, and they say I 
will do some focus group research and then they spend all the money and cannot say what the 
prevalence is. What we need to do is match the effort with the information that is needed. The 
gap in quality research is massive."10 Official government data is known to be problematic 
not just for reasons of manipulation, but also for quality control. It is known that census data 
was copied from one census to the next or that births and deaths records were poorly kept.11  
 
3.  Access to historical information is difficult. While the national archive provides access 
to the history of planning and investment, the reference system is outdated. Colonial 
resources in the national library are theoretically accessible but are poorly catalogued.12 Few 
international sources published after the 1960s are easily available.  
 
4. The international community too readily dismissed existing information, particularly if 
it was gathered before 2008. This might mean that useful information, particularly on 
uncontroversial topics, is discarded; indigenous ways of collecting and preserving 
information can get easily overlooked.  
 
5. Politics determine what information is deemed useful to gather or to foreground, with 
the exclusion of ethnic categories in the census regularly mentioned as a hot political issue 
that was threatening to the government. Issues of illegal trade, particularly involving the 
country’s poppy production, are politically difficult to research, both internally but also 
because they involve external actors. The impact of such a selective approach to what is 
deemed acceptable research was described by respondents as allowing the continued 
exclusion of ethnic groups or groups involved in illegal activities from national processes.”13 
There are continued concerns that the government is trying to influence information, more 
often than not through simply not supporting research that asks critical questions or through 
strategic use of hard facts.14 This challenge is exacerbated by the broader political landscape 
in which open contestation and accountability are new phenomena. “Politics here is 
something dangerous,” explained one opponent. “It’s long been oppressed by the 
                                                 
9
 Group discussion 1, males and females, national organisation with international partnership, Burmese and non-
Burmese nationals. 
10
 Respondent 6 and 7, male and female, national organisation, Burmese and non-Burmese national. 
11
 Respondent 8, female, international organisation, non-Burmese national. 
12
 Respondent 9, male, national organisation, non-Burmese national. 
13
 Respondents 10 and 11, male, national organisation, Burmese nationals. 
14
 Respondent 12, male, national organisation, Burmese national. 
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authorities.”15  
 
6. Informal information was in the past not recorded and continues to receive less 
attention, which limits record-keeping. One respondent explained that the backroom 
dynamics of the current peace process are crucial in bringing about change, yet these are not 
recorded16  
 
Despite these challenges, a number of respondents argued that research was currently playing 
a crucial role, albeit in unexpected ways. For example, particularly under-researched topics 
were purposely avoided. Awareness of lack of research on a particular topic focuses debates 
around other topics. A second influence of research on the current policy process that was 
outlined was an improvement in record keeping. Respondents said that policy-makers and 
practitioners who are more aware of the trend toward using research meant that organisations 
were paying much closer attention to the way in which they are documenting their 
information. This was seen as a step forward as it introduced a new awareness about the need 
for transparency. An interesting contradiction emerges from this.  Evidence-based policy 
supports the notion of transparency; often transparency is seen as being achievable by taking 
into account how a situation or policy challenge is understood at the grassroots. The push 
towards evidence means that quick ways of providing it have to be found, which more often 
than not means a top-down approach to using information. 
 
This contradiction sets out the crucial dilemma that the push towards evidence-based policies 
in Myanmar creates. It is implicit in the way in which international organisations frame their 
engagement, that with more evidence improvements will occur. There is a danger that the 
push for evidence replicates patterns of governing that the reform process is supposedly 
addressing. This danger comes from expectations about what research and evidence can 
contribute to policy processes and how these expectations are situated within Myanmar’s 
information tradition. Coupled with the presumed need to quickly bow towards donor 
interests while maintaining established ways of working in the government—to protect 
interests or simply to keep it functional—might mean that the evidence debate establishes 
firmly the use of information as a political tool. In a situation of transition, with some 
hallmarks of a post-conflict environment, this creates the danger that patterns of the past are 
becoming entrenched for the future.    
 
The reality of evidence in Myanmar 
The seemingly uncontested push for better evidence often shrouds the fact that evidence is 
not a clear-cut category. Calls for evidence tend to focus on particular types of knowledge 
needed by policy actors. Defining these needs is a complicated endeavour. They might be 
driven by wanting to maintain power or by a grassroots demand for a particular action. What 
gets classified as usable evidence is determined by administrative and political decisions, by 
bureaucratic interests to preserve a status quo or to change it, or by other incentives identified 
by policy makers. This is true for many different contexts, but of particular importance for 
Myanmar.  
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Here, practical use of evidence is currently focused on supporting planning; using evidence to 
develop strategic, sustainable and realistic policies grounded in the reality of the 
circumstances is largely a theoretical notion. One respondent described the current situation 
as “the demand-driven agenda” in which evidence is “not brought together for policy 
information.”17 Many of the respondents clearly understood evidence as driven by needs and 
interests of national or international groups.   
 
A way of navigating these multiple incentives was highlighted by one respondent who 
explained how his organisation had been working with a regional government to articulate its 
social protection needs:  
 
But we had to work out as well what they key person’s interests are in 
this. What are his priorities? One of them was poverty reduction: He 
wants his region to be developed, to reduce poverty. So we will do some 
research and we will pitch the direction of this and show the potential 
poverty reduction impact of social protection programmes. The politics 
comes in, in what evidence to pitch to what person.18  
 
Usability of evidence for localised and personalised interests thus defines where the 
knowledge interests of policy makers are focused. Respondents were very open about the fact 
that, while pitching into the language used in the evidence debate, they instrumentalised 
processes for their own interests, often presupposing what change was possible: "Before we 
produce research and evidence we have to understand what spaces for advocacy in these 
areas are open and how we would enter these spaces…If the space is closed, there is no point 
to produce evidence."19 Some insights into what might shape incentives that can open up 
spaces can be derived from descriptions of how evidence is used. For an international 
community cautious about its political engagement and yet eager not to miss opportunities, 
observing the actors seeking evidence can help in understanding trends.   
 
Section 3: Actors seeking evidence 
We have established that claims about evidence needs are expressions of particular interests 
or incentives. In calling for evidence, policy actors develop a certain set of requirements and 
an interpretative framework. The challenges outlined above show the extent to which 
requests for evidence by certain actors also automatically act as a dismissal of what exists, 
thus pushing for a particular shape and understanding of the transition process. 
 
This section looks in more detail at how different policy actors are described and 
experienced, either by those who represent them or those who engage with them. Policy 
actors differentiate between data and information. Data is the disembodied and seemingly 
disinterested version of evidence; information interpreted as the more grounded and rounded 
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interpretation of such data. This highlights the various interests served by the push for more 
evidence for better policies. 
 
In situations of great social and political shifts, knowledge and insight become the currency 
of the already powerful. Myanmar’s knowledge industry, although nascent, seems firmly in 
the hands of a few actors who are setting a path in which quiet, diverse and under-resourced 
voices are in danger of being drowned out. Knowledge is being refashioned using an 
insider/outsider division, as one respondent explained: “The NGO and donor community 
looks at a piece of evidence and puts it forward. Everyone will claim—donor, government, 
private sector—that they have pieces of evidence, facts, private data. They know what people 
want and everyone claims that they have this kind of information.”20  
 
The power of the stronger knowledge actors also comes with responsibility, which in turn has 
created some shifts. One example given was the election commission which, according to one 
respondent, “realised they have to answer the questions, it’s a huge shift for them to be open 
and transparent and accountable. If we look at this long-term, it’s incredible high stakes next 
year, but there is too much expectation on the President [and on] Aung San Suu Kyi for this 
to be the watershed moment. But nowhere in the world has done that ever, you have political 
process, economic development and the peace process going at the same time.”21  
 
Knowledge actor: government 
The most prominent information actor is the government of Myanmar; its use of data and 
information is under much scrutiny from the broader policy community.  This presents both a 
challenge and an opportunity as the policy community aims to find ways to systematise the 
process, with a number of issues particularly prominent. These issues have their roots in the 
long-standing problematic relationship between society and the state, where interaction was 
primarily oppressive or marked by strategic neglect.  
 
Government remains the only source for many types of data. Research actors having to rely 
on such data are thus limited in how much they are able to question the viability of existing 
policies or suggest new ones, leading at times to government interference in research work 
that uses government data.22 In many cases, getting to such government data—regardless of 
whether or not it is of usable quality—requires lengthy negotiation processes and established 
personal relationships with government actors that are out of reach for many smaller 
organisations which are seen as challenging government power: “[The government has] this 
view on data, of data as a state secret. It is power.”23 Several respondents pointed out that the 
tight link between having access to data and having good relationships with government 
actors also meant that organisations or individuals wanting to challenge the government were 
in a weak position to be able to do so with the government's own information. An added 
problem was that different government departments can deal with the same issue, doubling or 
tripling the effort needed to establish personal and unthreatening relationships. 
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Despite acting as a gatekeeper of information, there was a broad consensus among 
respondents that their expectations of the government’s ability to make use of data and 
information are generally low. Many respondents explained that the link between existing 
data and the government’s use of it was non-existent due to a lack of capacity to analyse data 
for its policy relevance. Policy planning and data collection happen in different realms, with 
both processes paper-based and centralised, or as one respondent describes it, “data is very 
siloed…so for programming and planning you have to have information from different 
departments.”24 Immigration data, for example, is collected by the Department of 
Immigration as well as by the general administration. Organisations needing this data have 
found discrepancies amongst the two data sets, further complicating its usability. In such 
situations, power relations overshadow any question of data quality, because, as one 
respondent argued, “some ministries are more powerful than others, how to manage that is 
still quite sensitive.”25  
 
However, simply to blame a lack of government capacity to use data overlooks the political 
use of information by the most important knowledge actor. Respondents highlighted that the 
image of government as incapacitated by information was misleading since, particularly in 
recent years, the government has established think tanks and advisory panels to tackle issues. 
Evidence of more strategic use of information for policy-making was seen by respondents for 
example in the process of granting telecom licences, or any policy that needed population 
figures as its basis.26  
 
Unpacking the role of the state 
A complicating factor is that government is often mistakenly imagined as one monolithic 
actor with clear inner workings. Government departments play unique roles in both allowing 
constructive processes and relationships to develop as well as in maintaining control over 
data and the framing of issues. Responsibilities on specific issues are often not clear-cut, with 
many government departments holding a stake. This makes it difficult to know who might 
have relevant information, but also who can act on it.27 It also highlights that a reform 
process does not proceed at even speed across all actors. "Some ministries are very reform-
minded, but not all," is how one researcher summed up the current situation, with the way 
changes were progressing largely based on personalities.28 One respondent vividly illustrated 
what this means: “It depends on the situation of the ministry how much influence bureaucrats 
have….Some bureaucrats really have the will to change and to accept democracy. But some 
of them say the life here is like a prison, we have to stay at the Minister’s house, wake up at 6 
in the morning, it’s like that. So it really depends how much they want to improve their 
ministry and improve their work.”29  
 
                                                 
24
 Respondent 1, male, national NGO, Burmese national. 
25
 Respondent 8, female, international organisation, non-Burmese national. 
26
 Respondent 5, male, national private sector organisation, non-Burmese national. 
27
 Respondent 18, female, national organisation, Burmese national. 
28
 Group discussion 1, males and females, national organisation with international partnership, Burmese and 
non-Burmese nationals. 
29
  Respondent 19, female, national organisation, Burmese national. 
15 
 
An example of how a relationship between government and NGOs works in practice was 
this:  
It depends on the ministry. For example, [one] ministry… is more open 
because they have more exposure of working with internationals and 
NGOs compared to, say, [another] ministry… which is still working in 
the way they used to in the past….There are some experts for instance 
in one of the departments…we work with her…She is very open, 
through her we are able to reach to the minister. But [this] Ministry … is 
famous for being hardliner. On [one of our reports] it was very hard to 
communicate with them. So we work with key civil society to try to 
catch the media attention - which we did for this recent report. We 
managed to get a relationship going with [one of the ministry’s 
departments] – they’re going to organise discussions with us about the 
recommendation of our reports. As the department is interested in the 
report they are hosting the event. This is interesting as this department is 
newly created and they are rivals of [the hardliners in another ministry] 
….  So for us this is a very good opportunity to influence [the relevant 
ministry] via this department’s work. In this case we are using the 
department as an indirect route to influence.30  
 
Knowledge actor: civil society 
Civil society activity in different policy fields in Myanmar has been strengthened after 
cyclone Nargis hit the country. Those civil society organisations (CSOs) that participated in 
relief and development work during this period emerged as viable actors with which both the 
government and international organisations and donors could more safely engage. Nowadays, 
broader civil society is implicitly expected to act as the balancer between the government’s 
protracted ways of doing things and the processes nudging towards change. Furthermore 
from a donor perspective, NGOs and CSOs seem to provide the natural counterpoint to 
government-driven evidence searches. “There is strong pressure from the donors to have 
CSOs and NGOs to try and implement their programmes in a better way. Multi-donor 
programmes are trying to put pressure on Myanmar NGOs so that they include research as 
part of their programming activities. It’s kind of difficult to have them develop this.”31 
 
As knowledge actors, CSOs struggle with the same challenges as government agencies: “I 
have met heads of CSOs and they are being asked to present evidence for their work and they 
have great difficulties to come up with something which is quality,” explained a respondent.32 
The notion of CSOs, and NGOs as challengers of government evidence agendas is 
misleading since, as one respondent argued, “Most organisations, especially NGOs, are very 
much service-providers; they do not have research capacity or very strong information 
management systems. They are in a very early stage. They do not even use the available 
information even when it is reliable.”33 Despite this reality, CSOs are often envisioned as 
knowledge actors with better connections to grassroots information. We witness a somewhat 
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circular development here:  Claims to acknowledge civil society as a functional and 
important knowledge actor are not driven by evidence that this understanding of civil society 
is appropriate for Myanmar.  
 
One respondent explained why this contradiction, if unaddressed, might contribute to 
entrenching current interpretations and systems, rather than pushing for increased research to 
build a broader evidence base that might help manoeuvre change. This respondent explained: 
I am quite concerned about the turn of the CSOs of Myanmar, because 
they are looking for nuggets [of knowledge]. Currently I see that a lot of 
CSOs are donor-driven, so I think  some of the CSO may think this is an 
alternative livelihood…The current trend of the CSO in Myanmar is 
concerning because the government can relax. Because the NGOs only 
construct the toilets and schools, so the government can relax. And the 
government can also show the international community the CSOs are 
doing that, so it seems like political change.34 
As a result, respondents saw a move of NGOs and CSOs towards becoming substitute service 
deliverers:  
They have very few CSOs and NGOs that have gone beyond this step as 
providing services to actually come up with an idea of building evidence 
and trying to collect evidence and doing research and come up with a 
statement. Few have been exposed to that. But when it comes to 
evidence that could possibly undermine the agenda of what the CSO or 
NGO is trying to achieve, I don’t think that will be a big issues. Heads 
of CSOs and NGOs here are honest enough to analyse if information is 
against what they are trying to promote. Usually former political 
activists, they are honest people.35 
   
Government/ civil society interactions 
Despite this evolving contradiction, respondents pointed to examples where civil society had 
acted as a control on government. Interaction between government and CSOs was enlivened 
through the process of drafting a controversial Association Law (Human Rights Watch 2013); 
yet more tensions have arisen from the realities of such interaction. During the controversial 
population census, explained one respondent:  
..minority civil society went for face-to-face discussion with the census 
commissions and they raised that this census activity interfered with the 
peace process in Myanmar—and also the Rohinja issue was raised. So 
from this side the CSO recommended not to count the ethnic name and 
the religious affiliation. They wanted to miss that category because it 
could raise a potential conflict because of the census activity. The 
government did take that advice from CSOs, but they still left it in. A lot 
of potential conflict rose up.36  
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Another respondent echoed the sentiment that government engagement with CSOs on 
knowledge and evidence was half-hearted: “It is just a showcase. The consultations sessions 
are made just to tick off on their “to do” list. They don’t really care.”37  
The process of signing off on the Association Law was regularly referenced as a display of 
uneasy interaction:  
Government recognised the role of civil society but has not entirely 
accepted it. Even the President made public statements about the role of 
civil society recently. But street level civil servants don’t know what 
this means for them within their work. There’s no outwards 
communication from the parliament or government side after the CSOs 
proposed this Association Law change. They take the suggestions but 
you don’t know what’s being discussed behind closed doors. We don’t 
know whether the feedback is taken seriously or not and then suddenly 
they announced the new law on July 18th, signed by the president. But 
the discussion between his office and the upper house is not known to 
the public—how they decided to amend and sign it or not.38  
 
International knowledge actors 
Donors are already a prominent knowledge actor, pushing knowledge production in specific 
directions or influencing how information is packaged. “It has to be concise enough to catch 
the attention of ambassadors,” was how one respondent explained the characteristics of useful 
evidence. 39 Another said that: 
Donors here are very keen on evidence, they say you are very good at 
activity reporting but where is your evidence? We have collected a lot of 
data and we are not good at using it. We know that. So we are also 
trying to change our outcome monitoring in our evaluation system. But 
the search for evidence is now strong, many donors are talking about 
outcome-and results-based work. And I think it’s fair enough, but it also 
makes it difficult for us to come up with verifiable indicators. 
Sometimes we worry although we understand that outcome is very 
important, which is the very reason why we are doing this intervention. 
But it also means that the process becomes not very important if you are 
focusing on the result. And this has tradition in this country, because the 
military government used to say we want your water. We don’t care if 
your bottle has a hole. And in the villages this means that they only 
pursue what they need to do regardless how much the people in the 
village suffer….Having to rely on donor funding is also frustrating, 
because more and more donors are saying that we want to see policy 
changes, and they fail to see the continued need for services.40  
The tension between an agenda to push forward evidence-based policies and the inherent 
political interests of knowledge actors in shaping the meaning of such agenda is focused in 
the role of donors in Myanmar:  
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Capitals need their time to find their position on Burma. There were 
strong lobby groups in London, Washington, Canberra who say do not 
invest in this process. But it’s balancing perceptions at home, trying to 
make an impact here and then you have donors waiting for the post-
election review in the first quarter of 2016 to see how they will invest. 
Donors will not continue paying money after the elections unless there 
is a recalibration after the elections. There will be new demands and 
also different issues. All of that is on the table for 2016. Who is going to 
invest in that? Is there money ready? The pressure is on for 2020. It’s 
important to send the right signals that this is a proper reform process.41  
 
A representative of a national NGO explained how this tension between pushing for reform 
while finding evidence for what might work in the reform was playing out in the relationship 
between donors and government: “We understand that donors need to have a good 
relationship with the government. But they also have to listen to us, but they have to listen to 
Myanmar government 70 per cent, even though the Myanmar government does only 30 per 
cent. I want to see that donors have a very strong message, saying hey guys if you are not 
doing this we cannot support you.”42  
 
Yet it was also pointed out that the relationship between donors and government was not 
always just guided by donors’ reluctance to support an unclear transition process. In terms of 
information, respondents argued that international actors were leading with a wrong example 
by treating information as proprietary, rather than making data and information as openly 
accessible as possible to encourage transparent engagement. One particularly poignant 
example was given about a UN agency that was withholding its data even when the 
government requested that other actors could use it.43  
 
Section 4: Producing and using evidence for policy 
In a situation where a lot of information exists, but little of it is gathered or kept in systematic 
and methodologically transparent ways, the question of what type of information is produced 
and how becomes particularly prominent. A corollary to this is the issue of how to interpret 
and decide the relevance of evidence for use in a given context. The focus on the production 
of evidence often suggests a clinical approach to the messy findings on social issues and 
human interaction. The reality does not match those expectations. While the generalisability 
of evidence is questionable even under the most stable of circumstances, the technical 
production of evidence, based on fixed methodologies, is often used to justify generalisability 
without having much information about the context of implementation. The difficult part is 
often to justify the reason that a particular piece of evidence might make sense in a specific 
context. It requires much research on broader social, political and cultural issues to allow the 
evaluation of evidential claims in a grounded manner. In the absence of this, the default 
position suggests that a given policy worked in another conflict context and therefore it 
should have relevance for this context too. In the case of Myanmar, rethinking might be 
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required when it comes to justifying generalisability: A policy context that consists of the 
forces of transition is difficult to evaluate. Even broadly applicable policies—for example, 
holding elections—might not be as generalisable as they seem. 
Current methods of research 
We have discussed the roles of different knowledge actors, as well as the problematic 
understanding of what evidence is. This section looks in more detail at the type of research 
(and by extension types of research methods) that different actors in Myanmar prefer at the 
moment and the implications of this.  
 
Having identified an information gap, most actors currently focus on reactive and descriptive 
research. The implications of filling information gaps in this way are profound. Reactive and 
descriptive research responds to programmatic goals already set, or to a readily identified 
knowledge gap, by providing a factual basis. In the future, information gathered for this 
purpose might be used to ask more in-depth questions; however, if it will ever come to that is 
not clear. Rather, many research projects are not asking fundamental questions that might 
help generate grounded knowledge that can act as a baseline in number of areas. The 
implications of this are important: Absence of grounded local knowledge can be expected to 
generate a cycle of recognising the paucity of information, followed by commissioning 
research to fill this gap. The cycle might continue without ever creating contextual, analytical 
tools for interpreting any data that is produced. 
 
Methods to fill the information gap are determined by the usability and implementability of 
immediate research outputs.44 Most research conducted at the moment in Myanmar naturally 
gravitates towards qualitative methods. These are cheaper, easier to implement—for better or 
for worse—and findings can often be presented as more niche insights. Focusing issues as 
narrowly and anecdotally as possible does not challenge the government on a broader issue.45 
However, it was noted that more in-depth qualitative research is currently hampered by a lack 
of expertise—it is notable that there is currently no working Burmese anthropologist.46 Few 
quantitative pieces of research have been done.  
 
Respondents also noted other shortcomings of current research. Because of the push for 
evidence for policy, policy actors frame research questions. This does not allow space for 
fundamental social and political research questions. In responding to the immediate need for 
knowledge, many groups quickly produce conceptually limited information. How this 
information will be used to establish future ground truths is not clear. It was argued that this 
created a whole subset of activist research.47 
 
This enhances the problem that even unprecedented and opaque processes such as the peace 
process are treated through readily available imaginations of what research can find out. The 
expedient need to get answers for policymaking means that answers are often given that 
support policy processes that have already  been decided. This is a known problem in the 
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intersection between evidence and policy. For Myanmar, this means that basic questions 
about the appropriateness of processes are not asked at all. Such research is, as one 
respondent argued, an attractive but reactive, rather than proactive, undertaking.48 It crucially 
creates a situation in which actors with less audible voices have no opportunity to frame 
questions or to propose areas of inquiry.  
 
Other organisations described their role as research supporters as that of a catalyst between 
community needs and translating these for NGOs and government. This meant that they 
organised community workshops in which research priorities are set. Although community 
members often act as volunteer researchers in such settings, discussions were guided along 
the lines of NGO and government frames of reference. The research was directly understood 
to be a necessary step towards establishing an "advocacy platform."49 Thus much of the 
research that is branded as grassroots-driven becomes a proxy for local voices, with outside 
researchers bringing assumed local insights to areas of inquiry already framed by actors with 
other interests. These processes stand-in for local knowledge, ultimately supporting already 
decided policy directions. 
 
The power of being able to drown out voices is particularly important in this context. NGO 
respondents argued that it was almost pointless to present evidence and research to the 
government. Their experience had been that government actors would only consider their 
own data, or at best data that big international organisations, namely the UN, had collected. 
Practically speaking, this means for some NGO staff that they were unable to use their 
findings if these contradicted UN findings, which inhibits locally-driven knowledge 
processes.50 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that international actors often treat data 
they collect as proprietary, presumably to avoid being cited as a data source on controversial 
findings that could alienate the government.51 Thus, only politically safe data is released, 
which exacerbates the challenge that smaller actors face when they want to act on their 
information that confronts the government. 
 
New issues or different perspectives are difficult to address in such an environment. Despite a 
push for information and evidence, the focus is on already identified issues, rather than on 
identifying new issues. What this means in practice was summed up in a group discussion in 
which a group of international and Burmese researchers said that they had “more of a quick-
and-dirty approach, trying to understand broadly how things are, rather than trying to get a 
deep understanding of things. How do we pick particular topics is what are the policy 
windows and what are the gaps that can be quickly achieved in terms of uptake.”52  
 
A notable exception to research that is not grounded and does not challenge might be research 
that begins from local concerns and frames its approach from local needs. This was 
exemplified by a local organisation whose research was initiated by concerns about 
accountability and transparency within the political institutions. They produced studies on the 
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functioning of parliament, aimed at compiling a baseline data set of how parliament works in 
practice. Methods used included scrutiny of records to mark the number of times different 
members of parliament raised questions and the number of issues that were brought to the 
attention of the parliament in this manner. This was augmented with polling people on their 
opinion about the workings of parliament—possibly muddying the waters between 
observation and perception. The organisation argued that their mode of data collection by 
mobile phones allowed a more honest reflection for respondents.53  
 
The emphasis on evidence might be counterproductive, inward-looking, and might thwart 
innovation. Particularly in the turbulent transitional times that Myanmar is experiencing, 
respondents articulated the concern that the evidence debate creates a conservative process, 
rather than a transformative one. "If you develop a model that is different from an old one, 
you should not reject it on the basis of it not having evidence. Evidence will come later, in the 
future," explained a respondent who is piloting a community-based resource management 
approach.  
This is very new to our country, but the regional government allows us 
to pilot in this area. We cannot see the evidence, because the approach is 
very new, one year, two years. But we cannot provide evidence for the 
resource management or conflict impact. We don't have that 
evidence….If you go only after evidence, you are closing for the 
innovation. Then you are going to go the formal way. For us, it's the 
more informal and innovative one. This is not very evidence-based 
because it's still in the pilot. Then DfID may close all the innovation in 
development, that is a danger. Because all problems need new 
solutions.54  
  Another respondent agreed: 
It's a balance we need to strike. If you stop and say you want to do 
something only when you have hard evidence to formulate a policy, you 
are going to be far behind. Of course, this is the goal we want to set, and 
we have to plan on that in five years. On the other hand, one has to start 
from somewhere, with the knowledge that this data is not hard or 
reliable data. So if we do that, then we can see what changes have to be 
made.55 
This is a dilemma: on the one hand it is good to have evidence on the other hand one cannot 
stop acting because there is a claimed lack of evidence, or unsatisfying research methods.  
  
Judging research quality and finding appropriate ways to assess the usability of research is 
challenging. Several respondents talked about their struggles to evaluate evidence within a 
situation of political shifts and contestations:  
I look at evidence based on the institutions: who brings this evidence? Is 
it an area that is more familiar to us so that we know this evidence is 
useful or not useful. And for me, if I see the evidence then I try to 
triangulate with other evidence. If it's in Myanmar, is there any other 
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evidence in the ASEAN or anything like that? This might mean that the 
evidence is very solid one.56  
Sometimes data manipulation and quality derives from method, rather than from intent:  
I worked with the government for 12 years... I know how my 
departments get their data. They only get their data by phone. For 
example, I am not blaming the government, but the decision makers 
may be misunderstood. For the food security, they are only focusing on 
rice production, not multi-stakeholder or multidisciplinary approach. So 
what happened in the past, the managing director of the ministry needs 
to report to the Minister how much cotton we grow. Every day. We can 
grow cotton only two seasons, sometimes only one season. But they 
want the data every day.57 
 Interference from existing dynamics into the research process often goes unacknowledged:  
Sometimes data has misleading interview questions or sometimes I can 
see the sample size and the geographical region. I can say that this data 
is not reliable. Because also sometimes NGO conducted the interviews 
with the assistance of the village committee. So sometimes it can be 
wrong or incorrect.58  
There is a danger that research is used to displace political discussion or to move along 
processes that are deeply political, but can be shrouded by the use of facts:  
There is the blind trust in the science and formulas. Here we ask very 
simple questions, which hide a net of very complicated questions. I 
don't know if it’s a matter of political pressure, time, capacity, but it's 
difficult to go the next step and say what you are talking about is not a 
simple question. You are talking about what kind of development you 
want to have, what kind of social system, but while you are having a 
blind faith in science, you do not ask these questions.59  
   
Using research for policy 
Some of the concerns surrounding the debate on using research for policy are very technical. 
Respondents mentioned that few national staff are in decision-making positions in 
international organisations that could push for a policy. Few have the capacity to evaluate 
information and reformulate it to fit a policy drafting process. The communication skills that 
make a policy process more than a bureaucratic exercise are often lacking.60 This links to the 
challenging process of using research in a policy process.  
 
In the three challenges to this process, a crucial final step is the weighing of available 
evidence to decide which one to use for particular policies. Views of particular actors and 
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their political positions are central in this step. Even in political environments that are more 
conducive for general research, this step highlights that basing policies on evidence is a 
programme planning tool, rather than a scientifically indisputable grounding of an 
intervention. Another way to understand how policy actors' interests frame a policy is by 
examining what kind of evidence is considered, or dismissed, as powerful by the actors 
concerned. 
 
Others had more defined technical notions of evidence that had been adapted for the current, 
often fluid context:  
For us, it's a combination of numbers as well as other people's feelings. 
It's important because in our field we work with marginalised 
communities, so we go particularly to the conflict-prone area and 
impacted area… and sometimes in our work we don't need to know how 
many students have been displaced. But we only need to know that this 
village that was there is no longer there. Sometimes that's enough 
evidence, that the village that was there in 2012 was displaced due to 
fighting. All we care at this point is that this is a community we need to 
care about. But there are other things: war is going on, people's attitude 
towards the government, the current state of affairs in the country, if a 
student does not feel comfortable to go back to a place or be with 
people, that's enough evidence for us.61 
 The notion of multiple sources and multiple perspectives—and how these might be 
combined in sophisticated arguments that allow fine-tuned programming—was identified as a 
challenge:  
What kind of evidence? Peace talks’ evidence is never simple, very 
complicated…People from outside the peace process, no one has the 
stamina for complexity. They want something simple: he is good, he is 
bad. You have the phenomenon, where people search for spoilers and 
people really don’t understand the dynamics within a negotiation. I am 
telling everyone some people negotiate for themselves, some for their 
bosses, some cannot be bought, some are ideologically driven. We have 
a lot of things here, resources, unresolved things for 70 years, and the 
peace process has been an initiative in the larger backdrop of social 
reforms. You can’t just look at the peace process alone. You have to look 
at it from a larger perspective.62 
The peace process might be an apt example to highlight a problematic notion that emerges 
within the broader evidence debate. The idea that evidence can be used to understand a 
situation and respond to it through programming is powerful and yet misleading. Based on 
such a notion of using evidence for policy, evidence becomes refashioned as a manifestation 
of the truth, rather than as a snapshot of a particular situation and its interpretation. Several 
respondents were struggling with the tension between gathering evidence today and 
simultaneously shaping what evidence might look like in the future, particularly if a first 
round of policies based on the evidence had been implemented. 
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Conclusion: Myanmar and evidence-based policy 
Implicit in the notion of evidence-based policies is that better knowledge will create better 
programmes. Another assumption is that the context within which evidence will be evaluated 
and then used to support policy is transparent. Several caveats remain under-examined in this 
presumed chain of events for Myanmar, particularly regarding the roles of knowledge actors, 
production of knowledge and use of such knowledge for policy. The concept of evidence is 
very loosely interpreted in this context.  
 
Some organisations aim to use the challenge constructively by linking minimal available 
information to broader programmatic or political goals. This poses the danger that model-
based approaches become prominent, foregrounding questions of implementation, rather than 
asking whether specific models are the right way for Myanmar in the first place. Respondents 
expressed their doubts that the focus on evidence in the policy debate is a useful one: 
Evidence-based policy approach - the issue has to be there, and I think 
we need to engage. But we have to just keep in mind that it will work in 
an ideal situation. …Because in Myanmar, even if you talk to a lot of 
people and collect evidence, you cannot know to what extent they are 
telling you the truth. People are scared and politics are very polarised. 
Where you can go and where you cannot go determines what evidence 
you can get. That's the Myanmar situation. But as we move out of this in 
other ways, not through evidence- based policy approach, maybe one 
day we can look at that. But currently in Myanmar that’s not the way to 
do it, but I don't mean to say that we should not engage in that dialogue, 
I wish we could do that.63  
 
The usefulness of this approach is thus not as obvious as it might seem. One crucial element 
that is lacking in the current push for evidence-based policy in Myanmar is grounding this 
debate in evidence: evidence on the known complications of this process, of the challenges of 
research and of working within a political context. Even in the most favourable 
circumstances, the evidence on evidence-based policy for social processes is that it rarely 
works. In Myanmar, this complication is further exacerbated because the circumstances in 
which research is conducted in Myanmar highlight that the evidence debate is 
instrumentalised.  
 
Most of the policy-relevant socio-economic research is currently conducted with funding 
from international sources. Immediate policy interests of different international policy actors 
in Myanmar—including international NGOs—broadly frame the research orientation. It is 
clear that many of the respondents thought that the government is more interested in research 
and better understands the relationship between evidence and policy than it might be given 
credit for. Therefore, for international policy actors evidence has become a way of persuading 
the government to act in particular ways.  
 
The underlying assumption about how evidence-based policy works is simple: If 
policymakers are presented with the facts of a matter, the decision-making will be faster and 
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lead to a desired solution. This technical notion of the process ignores that the decision-
making processes of the government are not clear. Repeatedly we learned that nobody knows 
how government actors weigh the knowledge they have, how they go about finding out what 
they do not know, or how they access research through CSOs. It is clear that personal 
relationships matter tremendously and that individual networks of CSO members reach into 
the government. Not only the actors pushing for a technical understanding of evidence 
benefit from this approach—the government does, too. It allows an instrumentalisation of the 
current piecemeal evidence-based policy negotiations with different policy actors.  
 
It is currently easier to fund policy-relevant research yet at the same time there is an 
inadequate understanding of how policy decisions are made. This intersection of what kind of 
research is funded and a lack of knowledge about how it is used creates a long-term problem. 
Many policy actors allocate money for research in a politically expedient manner to influence 
what they see as the government policy processes. However, the output from these processes 
is focused on the present; it is unlikely that such approach to research and policy will allow 
the building of a deep knowledge base. Given that capacity to conduct research in Myanmar 
is limited, this mostly externally driven process is integrating most local researchers into a 
particular model of knowledge creation. It is thus unclear from where future capacity to 
conduct research that is independent of policy interests might come.  
 
The evidence debate theoretically takes place within the broader context of knowledge 
production processes and the way in which knowledge production supports evidence use 
when policy questions change over time. Myanmar’s history, the transition to a post-
conflict/post-authoritarianism context and the way in which international policy interests are 
intersecting with these suggest that this relationship between knowledge and evidence is 
reversed. Evidence is produced in piecemeal fashion. This means there is no attempt to create 
an integrated knowledge and knowledge production process that can support evidence needs 
in the future. Given Myanmar’s history, this looks dangerously close to the knowledge 
management of the authoritarian regime in the past.  
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